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"There will never be another Van Gorkom."'
Smith v. Van Gorkom2 (the Trans Union case) is now well-established
as one of the most important-and mystifying-corporate law cases of the
decade. The Delaware Supreme Court stunned and dismayed the corpo-
rate bar by holding that a board of directors violated its duty of care to
shareholders by failing to exercise sufficient deliberation before approving
a cash-out merger at a fifty percent premium over the market price. The
case seemed to augur broad new liability for corporate directors. It imme-
diately received widespread attention, both because it carried important
implications for corporate counseling and because it suggested that the
Delaware courts might be prepared to increase the rights of shareholders
as against incumbent boards under the Business Judgment Rule.3
Not surprisingly, Trans Union sparked lively debate among commenta-
tors. Most have disparaged the decision for undermining the Business
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1. Mr. Justice Moore, at oral argument in Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del.
1985) (May 21, 1985).
2. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
3. The Business Judgment Rule provides generally that courts will not second-guess actions of
corporate boards of directors which reflect the exercise of reasonable business judgment, even if those
actions turn out to have been mistaken in the light of hindsight. For general background on the
Business Judgment Rule, see D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE:
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS (1987); M. LANE, REPRESENTING
CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 43-86 (1987); Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revis-
ited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979).
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Judgment Rule.4 Others have praised it for the same reason.5 Still others
see the case as not representing any significant change in prior law.'
None of these positions adequately explains the decision. They all share
the same defect: they attempt to analyze the case within the standard con-
ceptual framework of the Business Judgment Rule. Within this frame-
work, the case seems anomolous, to say the least, and quite possibly mis-
guided. But Trans Union is not, at bottom, a business judgment case. It is
a takeover case. Its function is to regulate a target's response to certain
types of takeover bids, namely "rush" offers with short time fuses. Seen in
this light, it fits easily with other recent Delaware decisions.
The view of Trans Union as a takeover case has implications for corpo-
rate counseling. Although the case does suggest that corporate boards
should take additional precautions in the procedures they use in making
major decisions, it does not pose a serious threat of liability to officers and
directors. The case should not be understood as interfering with the broad
discretion given to corporate boards under the Business Judgment Rule
outside the takeover context.
Further, it is necessary to understand Trans Union as a takeover case
in order to make coherent judgments about whether the case was rightly
or wrongly decided. The answer to that question depends on an empirical
analysis of whether the costs of the rule, namely increased transaction
costs and reduced likelihood that a control transaction will occur, exceed
the benefits of stimulating auctions that enhance shareholder welfare and
increase economic efficiency. This Comment concludes that the costs of the
Trans Union case most likely exceed the benefits. We therefore join the
majority of commentators who question the wisdom of the decision, al-
though our reasons for doing so differ markedly from those advanced in
prior work.
4. E.g., Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437,
1455 (1985) ("surely one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate law"); Herzel & Katz,
Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAW. 1187 (1986)
("misguided"); Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van
Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985) (suggesting, however, that Delaware courts will not apply case's
language stringently).
5. E.g., Chittur, The Corporate Director's Standard of Care: Past, Present, and Future, 10
DEL. J. CORP. L. 505, 543 (1985) ("Trans Union is a long-overdue judicial affirmation of the need
for better informed directors and, consequently, more responsible corporate behavior.").
6. E.g., Moskin, Trans Union: A Nailed Board, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 428 (1985); Prickett,
An Explanation of Trans Union to "Henny-Penny" and Her Friends, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 451
(1985) (author was counsel to the plaintiffs in Trans Union); Quillen, Trans Union, Business Judg-
ment, and Neutral Principles, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465 (1985) (author's firm represented the indi-
vidual defendants); Radin, The Director's Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 707 (1988); Schwartz & Wiles, Trans Union: Neither "New" Law nor "Bad" Law,
10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 429 (1985). One commentator has suggested that the opinion was based partly
on a perceived breach of the duty of loyalty. Kirk, The Trans Union Case: Is it Business Judgment
Rule as Usual?, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 467 (1986).
[Vol. 98: 127
Trans Union Reconsidered
I. TRANS UNION AS A BUSINESS JUDGMENT CASE: DIFFICULTIES
WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ANALYSIS
When viewed in conventional terms, as a business judgment case,
Trans Union presents a number of perplexing problems. First, although
the court defined the applicable standard of care as gross negligence, it
seemed to apply a more stringent standard on the facts of the case. Second,
Trans Union appears to depart dramatically from prior law and to upset
settled expectations, a suprising result for a court widely known for its
predictability. Third, Trans Union apparently displays a mysterious anti-
management bias even though the Delaware courts have a reputation for
favoring incumbent managers. Finally, the remedy prescribed by Trans
Union appears to be largely cosmetic and even self-defeating, despite the
Delaware courts' reputation for comptence in corporate law matters.
A. The Gross Negligence Standard and the Facts
While the majority opinion claimed to have articulated a "gross negli-
gence" standard as governing the case,7 the facts did not support a finding
of negligence, much less gross negligence. There was no suggestion that
the board of five inside and five outside directors acted out of any im-
proper motive.' Their credentials and business experience were superb.9
The merger had been negotiated by Van Gorkom, the Trans Union
Chairman, an attorney and certified public accountant who had many
years of experience with the corporation and owned a substantial block of
stock.1°
Most important, the economic rationale for the merger was obvious:
Trans Union possessed valuable tax credits that it could not use but that
could be sold to the bidder through a merger.1 The board acted quickly,
not because it failed to understand the gravity of its decision, but because
the bidder had insisted that it respond to the proposal within three days.12
The board had been warned by counsel that failure to approve the merger
might result in personal liability.13 The purchase price of $55 a share,
representing a fifty percent premium over market, hardly seemed inade-
quate, particularly since the firm's shares were publicly traded, and had
never traded at a price higher than $39 .14 After the board originally
7. Trans Union, 488 A.2d at 873.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 868. At the time of the merger the five inside directors had served on corporate
boards of directors for a combined total of 68 years, and the five outside directors had 53 years
cumulative service as Trans Union directors. Id. at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 865-66; see Ruling in, Jury Still Out on Trans Union, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 8, 1987,
§ 7, at 3, col. 2.
11. Trans Union, 488 A.2d at 864-65.
12. Id. at 867.
13. Id. at 868.
14. See id. at 866 n.5.
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approved the merger, it met again to reconsider the matter.1" Shareholders
overwhelmingly approved the merger."l
In short, the facts, the ostensible legal standard, and the holding are
contradictory. Commentators have attempted to resolve this puzzle in two
ways. Most attempt to conform the law to the facts, by positing that gross
negligence was not the actual rule applied by the court.1 7 They argue that
although the court maintained the rhetoric of gross negligence, the case
signalled a significant tightening of the standard.
This reasoning, however, is not particularly satisfactory. If the court
wanted to signal a change in the law, it need not have relied so explicitly
on a gross negligence standard, which had been expressly adopted only a
year earlier in a quite different context.' Moreover, subsequent Dela-
ware decisions utterly fail to document any change in the applicable stan-
dard of care in the wake of Trans Union."
A minority of commentators have attempted to conform the facts to the
gross negligence standard articulated by the majority.2" They focus on cer-
tain facts, highlighted in the majority opinion, that tend to impeach the
thoroughness of the board's deliberations. Van Gorkom negotiated the
merger without consulting the rest of the board.2" The board approved the
merger in a two-hour meeting, without examining the underlying merger
documents.22 No outside expert such as an investment banker was con-
sulted as to the fairness of the purchase price.2 3 The agreement prohibited
Trans Union from soliciting competing bids and gave the bidder an option
to purchase one million shares at a slight premium over the then-
prevailing market price, which it could resell if a higher bidder ap-
peared.24 The agreement was signed by Van Gorkom in his study while
he was hosting a party for the Chicago Lyric Opera.25
These facts do not, in the opinion of most observers, establish anything
15. Id. at 869-70.
16. Id. at 870.
17. See Note, Corporations - Directors Who Approve Sale of Corporation Without Sufficient
Deliberation Not Entitled to Protection Afforded by Business Judgment Rule - Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), 16 SETON HALL L. REv. 242, 271-72 (1986) [hereinafter Seton
Hall Note] (arguing that court "applied the much stricter standard of simple negligence"); see also
Fischel, supra note 4, at 1445 (arguing that gross negligence is not plausible explanation for facts);
Quillen, supra note 6 (criticizing case for being incorrectly decided on its facts and insufficiently
principled); Comment, Mining the Safe Harbor? The Business Judgment Rule After Trans Union,
10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 545, 567 (1985) (arguing that court deemed grossly negligent actions that un-
doubtedly would have been safe before Trans Union).
18. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (derivative action charging waste of corpo-
rate assets).
19. See infra note 68.
20. E.g., Prickett, supra note 6; Radin, supra note 6, at 754.
21. Trans Union, 488 A.2d at 866-67.
22. Id. at 868-69.
23. Id. at 876.
24. Id. at 868.
25. Id. at 869.
[Vol. 98: 127
Trans Union Reconsidered
like gross negligence." Many corporate decisions of equal moment are
made with less deliberation. The board had no reason to question the
sincerity of the bidder or the fairness of the purchase price. Indeed, given
that the deal appeared to be so favorable, the board surely was entitled to
some leeway in the formality of the procedures which it used to evaluate
the matter.
Moreover, the court seemed determined to make an example of the
Trans Union board: it overturned the trial court's fact-finding,2 7 and it
rejected the board's defense that any defects had been ratified by share-
holder approval, on the somewhat strained ground that the board had
failed to make full disclosure in the proxy statement.28 In addition, the
Delaware courts have rejected a number of challenges to board delibera-
tions that seemed no more careful than the actions deemed inadequate in
Trans Union.29 Thus, viewing the case as being rightly decided on the
basis of a gross negligence standard is not a particularly satisfying way of
reconciling the apparent inconsistency between the facts and the law.
B. The Surprising Departure from Settled Business Judgment Law
The outcome of the case was exactly opposite to what virtually every
observer of Delaware law would have predicted." Prior case law had sug-
gested that when a corporate decision was challenged, the Business Judg-
ment Rule provided a safe harbor to board members so long as (1) there
was no self-dealing or conflict of interest; (2) the board actually addressed
and decided the issue, rather than neglecting it; (3) the board members
properly informed themselves prior to reaching a decision; and (4) the
board's actions were not completely unjustifiable or irrational.3" The ac-
tions criticized by the court in Trans Union surely would have been pro-
tected under this safe harbor approach.
It is widely understood that both the Delaware courts and the members
of the bar specializing in Delaware corporate law place an extremely high
26. See infra note 30.
27. E.g., Trans Union, 488 A.2d at 871, 880.
28. Id. at 890-93.
29. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (upholding board's deci-
sion, reached after cursory debate, to approve novel "poison pill" plan which fundamentally altered
rights of shareholders and management); see also cases cited infra note 68.
30. See Spiegel, The Liability of Corporate Officers, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1985, at 48, 51 (discussing
liability exposure of corporate directors in wake of Trans Union); Leisner, Boardroom Jitters: A
Landmark Court Decision Upsets Corporate Directors, Barron's, Apr. 22, 1985, at 34 (same); A
Landmark Ruling that Puts Board Members in Peril, Business Week, Mar. 18, 1985, at 56 (same);
No More Easy Street for Company Directors, U.S. News & World Report, Mar. 4, 1985, at 95
(same); Borden, First Thoughts on the Decision in Delaware on Trans Union, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 25,
1985, at 1, col. 3 (same).
31. E.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (directors must be disinterested and
informed); Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (board's decisions will not be
disturbed "if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose"); Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316
A.2d 599, 609 (Del. Ch.) (application of rule depends on showing that informed directors did, in fact,
make business judgment), affd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
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value on consistency and predictability. 2 These features are highly valued
because they facilitate planning and reduce the risks of corporate action.
Indeed, one of the key ingredients of Delaware's recipe for success in the
competitive market for corporate charters is the degree to which Delaware
law provides reasonably certain and reliable rules to govern behavior. The
Trans Union case appears especially problematic in light of Delaware's
justified reputation for consistency, since under at least one interpretation
it worked a dramatic and unanticipated change, muddied a previously
well-understood area of law, and imposed unforeseeable and devastating
economic penalties on a corporate board.3
The existing literature again resolves this problem in two ways. Most
commentators view Trans Union as an exception to the general pattern in
Delaware, a rare case that changes the law without prior warning and
leaves it in a confused and unsatisfactory condition. 4 This view is not
particularly satisfying, however, since it posits that the Delaware Supreme
Court inexplicably deviated from a course it had consistently, and, for
Delaware, profitably followed theretofore. Other writers suggest that
Trans Union was consistent with prior cases and not unanticipated after
all. 5 But the evidence is overwhelming that the decision shocked and
amazed a large segment of the corporate bar. 8 The existing analyses of
Trans Union do not adequately explain why the court suddenly altered
the ground rules.
C. The Apparent Anti-Management Bias
Trans Union is also problematic because it appears to be anti-manage-
ment. The case severely penalized members of a corporate board by sad-
dling them with potentially devastating personal liability.3" The tone of
32. See Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65
TEX. L. REv. 469, 484 (1987); Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle,
1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 277 (1985).
33. Delaware corporate law has been developing in the way Bayless Manning claims common
law often develops - "in a manner reminiscent of a shipboard passenger making his way from the
bar to his stateroom, careening first against one bulkhead and then thrown against the other." Man-
ning, supra note 4, at 2.
34. See Seton Hall Note, supra note 17, at 269; Herzel & Katz, supra note 4, at 1190-91.
35. E.g., Burgman & Cox, Corporate Directors, Corporate Realities and Deliberative Process:
An Analysis of the Trans Union Case, 11 J. Corp. L. 311, 320 (1986); Prickett, supra note 6;
Schwartz & Wiles, supra note 6. Some, such as Manning, supra note 4, at 4, suggest that even if out
of line with other Delaware cases, Trans Union will eventually be "fitted. . . into the mainstream of
business judgment rule jurisprudence."
36. See, e.g., Herzel & Katz, supra note 4, at 1188; Manning, supra note 4, at 1; sources cited
supra note 30.
37. The case was eventually settled for $23.5 million, an amount far in excess of the $10 million
limit on the company's directors' liability policy. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, No. 6342 (Del. Ch. Oct.
11, 1985); Seton Hall Note, supra note 17, at 273. Most of the board's damages were eventually paid
by the acquiror. Pritzkers Foot Director's Bill for Trans Union Settlement, Crain's Chicago Business,
Aug. 12, 1985, at 19. However, the directors did have to pay roughly $2.5 million out of their own
pockets. Van Gorkom himself picked up the tab for the company's five outside directors. Ruling In,
Jury Still Out on Trans Union, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 8, 1987, § 7, at 9, col. 4.
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the opinion was harsh and uncharitable towards the defendants, sounding
at times, as Justice McNeilly observed in dissent, more like "an advocate's
closing address to a hostile jury"3 than an impartial judicial opinion.
This aspect of the case appears anomolous in light of Delaware's long-
standing reputation as a jurisdiction that protects the interests of manage-
ment. In the words of Professor William Cary, the most prominent expo-
nent of this theory, Delaware has promoted a "race for the bottom" in
corporate regulation by failing to protect shareholders against actions by
the incumbent management of Delaware corporations. 9 Although some
have rejected Cary's harsh criticism of Delaware,4 ° his assessment of Del-
aware law as generally giving great discretion to corporate managers is
still universally accepted. 1 Why should the Delaware Supreme Court
suddenly deviate from this pattern and impose new restrictions on man-
agement discretion, backed by the in terrorem threat of massive personal
liability?
The existing literature has several explanations for this puzzle. Some
scholars take the position that Trans Union signals a shift in Delaware
case law towards more stringent regulation of management behavior.'
2
According to Professor Fischel, the court appears finally to have come
under the spell of Professor Cary, a development that he views as unfortu-
nate."3 Other scholars who endorse the Cary approach agree that Trans
Union presages increased regulation of managers, but view this as a desir-
able development." The thesis that the Delaware court has converted to
Caryism is, however, exceedingly difficult to credit. There is no reason
why the Delaware courts should suddenly depart from a strategy that has
proved so remarkably successful over many years. Furthermore, a strong
anti-management bias simply cannot be discerned either in opinions is-
38. Trans Union, 488 A.2d at 893 (MeNeilly, J., dissenting).
39. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705
(1974).
40. In recent years, scholars associated with the law and economics movement have argued that
rules apparently favoring management may also be in the best interest of shareholders. See, e.g., R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 389-92 (3d ed. 1986); R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE
CORPORATION 28-42 (1978); Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the
Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON. 179 (1985); Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on
Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913 (1982). For a sugges-
tion that both approaches are partly true, see Macey & Miller, supra note 32.
41. Even law and economics theorists who reject the Cary thesis of a "race for the bottom" ac-
knowledge that managers generally enjoy broad discretion under Delaware law. See, e.g., Fischel,
supra note 40; Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
42. See Herzel & Katz, supra note 4, at 1188; Chittur, supra note 5, at 527; Seton Hall Note,
supra note 17, at 269; Comment, supra note 17, at 566.
43. Professor Fischel suggests that, although Cary's position is now "discredited" in scholarly
circles, "[tihe one entity that appears to have been most influenced by Cary is the Delaware Supreme
Court." Fischel, supra note 4, at 1454.
44. E.g., Chittur, supra note 5, at 527 ("With the Trans Union decision, Delaware has con-
founded its critics by signaling that the 'race to the bottom' is over. At the least, Delaware is no longer
the winner.").
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sued around the time of Trans Union45 or in those that have appeared
since.46
Other scholars suggest that Trans Union does not represent an anti-
management decision.4" They note that the case contains rhetoric helpful
to management in future cases, that it penalized only egregious behavior,
and that Delaware has always protected shareholders against management
malfeasance. Yet no one would seriously argue that Delaware has been a
leader among chartering states in restricting management discretion. Del-
aware has always afforded shareholders protection against serious man-
agement abuse. But the facts of Trans Union did not establish any serious
abuse. Accordingly, Trans Union cannot be satisfactorily explained either
as part of an anti-management trend in Delaware law or as a continua-
tion of existing limitations on management discretion.
D. The Ineffectiveness of the Remedy
Finally, Trans Union is perplexing because the remedy prescribed by
the court appeared to be purely a nostrum. The opinion strongly suggests,
and many commentators have noted, that corporate managers faced with a
situation like that confronting the Trans Union board can insure against
liability by creating a paper record demonstrating that the board has en-
gaged in due deliberations.48 Most importantly, a board can substantially
insulate itself by obtaining an opinion of an investment banker as to the
fairness of the transaction.4 9 A corporation's lawyers can also insulate the
board by making sure that the members are provided advance copies of all
documents reflecting a proposed transaction, and that the minutes reflect a
full and extended discussion of the pros and cons.50 Such procedures, how-
ever, do not provide any reliable guarantee that the transaction will bene-
fit shareholders. Fairness opinions of investment bankers are notorious for
the degree to which they can be induced to reflect the wishes of the in-
45. See, e.g., Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983). Weinberger substantially reversed the two cases cited by Professor Fischel as evidencing
an anti-management strain in Delaware decisions: Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del.
1977), and Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981).
46. E.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) (allowing
takeover defense measures on finding that they were taken in good faith after reasonable investiga-
tion); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (allowing corporate self-tender
that excluded hostile bidder from participation); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del.
1985) (allowing corporation to create poison pill even when no specific hostile offer threatened).
47. E.g., Burgman & Cox, supra note 35, at 320-26; Schwartz & Wiles, supra note 6, at
447-49.
48. See Moskin, supra note 6, at 427-28; Schwartz & Wiles, supra note 6, at 445-46. For an
insightful list of corporate planning strategies in the wake of Trans Union, see Manning, supra note
4, at 8-14.
49. The court declined to require an outside valuation, but suggested that the existence of such an
opinion would be given considerable weight in any duty of care suit. Trans Union, 488 A.2d at
875-78.
50. It probably would be wise to consult on any controversial matter with counsel from the state
of Delaware. See, e.g., Prickett, supra note 6, at 458 n.28.
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cumbent board.5" Even if board members are provided with advance cop-
ies of merger documents, there is no guarantee they will read them care-
fully, and even if they do, the degree to which anyone but a lawyer can
comprehend the fine print is suspect.
Some commentators, recognizing the problem, throw up their hands
and conclude that the court has mandated procedures which are useless,
or which indeed are worse than useless because they amount to a "tax" on
corporate control transactions, the costs of which fall on Delaware corpo-
rations and their shareholders and the benefits of which accrue to invest-
ment bankers and lawyers in other states.52 But it is highly unlikely that
the Delaware Supreme Court, widely recognized as one of the nation's
ablest and most experienced in matters of corporate law,53 would adopt a
rule with such self-defeating consequences. Other commentators have ap-
plauded the increased formality of board deliberations that the opinion is
likely to induce, on the ground that the consequence will be more in-
formed decisionmaking." However, when the putative benefits of in-
creased formality are weighed against the costs, especially the multi-
million dollar fees charged by investment banks, the argument that the
enhanced procedures are beneficial is not particularly convincing.
II. TRANS UNION AS A TAKEOVER CASE
As the preceeding discussion demonstrates, the received understanding
of Trans Union fails to explain a number of perplexing aspects of the
case. In our view, the defects in the conventional analysis arise from the
fact that the case has been uniformly perceived as a business judgment
case. Many of the difficulties can be overcome if it is conceptualized, not
as a business judgment case, but as a takeover case.55
The key to understanding the case is that the bidder, Marmom Group,
placed a stringent time deadline on the board's response to the bid. If the
board did not accept the bid within three days, Marmom threatened to
withdraw the offer. From the standpoint of the acquiror, this kind of bid
is one method of ensuring that the acquiror does not expend its resources
51. Readers can draw their own conclusions from the behavior of the investment bank in Solash v.
Telex Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) t 93,608 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988). Even the Delaware Su-
preme Court is suspicious of the reliability of fairness opinions, at least when they serve the interests
of acquirors. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983) (investment bank brought
fairness opinion to directors' meeting with price left blank).
52. E.g., Fischel, supra note 4, at 1453-54; Herzel & Katz, supra note 4, at 1191-92.
53. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 32, at 484-87, Romano, supra note 32, at 280.
54. E.g., Burgman & Cox, supra note 35; Comment, Limiting Corporate Directors' Liability:
Delaware's Section 102(bX7) and the Erosion of the Directors' Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
239, 250 (1987); Prickett, supra note 6, at 462 ("directors will be more fully informed and better able
to evaluate management's recommendations, rather than just rubber-stamping them.").
55. The view of Trans Union advanced here has not, to our knowledge, previously been proposed
in the literature, other than in a passing comment in an earlier article by the present authors. See
Macey & Miller, supra note 32, at 517-19.
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to put a target "in play" - by researching the target's value, obtaining
financing commitments, drawing up merger documents and the like -
only to have the prize snatched away by a later, higher bidder."6
From the standpoint of the target's board, however, a rush bid can cre-
ate an exceptionally difficult problem, especially if, as in Trans Union,
the initial bid represents a big premium over market. If the board rejects
the bid, or fails to act within the deadline, the acquiror may drop the bid.
Because the deadline for decision is so short, the board must make its
decision without any assurance that if the bidder drops out, another,
higher bidder will appear. Thus, in rejecting a bid or failing to act in a
timely fashion, the board may harm shareholders and, at worst, may be-
come subject to possible liability for failing to sell the company at a
favorable price.5" If, on the other hand, the board accepts the rush bid, it
thereby substantially reduces the possibility that an auction will develop
for the company in which the price paid to shareholders is driven well
above the initial bid. This too can lead to board liability.
58
The damages remedy imposed by Trans Union provides a solution to
the board's dilemma. After Trans Union, a board faced with a rush bid
need only say: "we can't possibly accept your bid by the deadline because
we need time to obtain the opinion of an outside investment banker as to
its fairness." 59 Trans Union eliminates the possibility that the board of a
Delaware corporation will be held liable to shareholders if it delays mak-
ing a decision and the bidder thereupon drops its offer. By eliminating
this possibility, the Delaware Supreme Court has removed one horn of the
dilemma. This is the crucial mechanism by which the Court has ensured
that future boards will not face the quandary of the Trans Union direc-
tors, who feared liability for not accepting the bid.
The breathing space offered by Trans Union gives the board the one
resource that is most crucial in a takeover contest: time. During the period
in which the investment bank is preparing a fairness opinion (and an in-
vestment bank sensitive to its customer's needs might conclude that a thor-
ough opinion takes a good while to prepare) the incumbent board, if it
wants to remain independent, can marshal its takeover defenses. It can
56. See generally Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 1028 (1982).
57. The court in Trans Union specifically held that despite the time constraints imposed by the
acquiror, there was no "exigency of a crisis or emergency" present justifying any reduction in the
quality of board deliberation. Trans Union, 488 A.2d at 874.
58. The rush bidder will always, as in Trans Union, insist that the board provide assurances that
other bidders will not be encouraged to use the first bid to begin a bidding war. In Trans Union those
assurances were provided by the board's commitment not to solicit other bids, and by the acquiror's
option to purchase a large amount of the target's stock at close to the pre-existing market price for
resale at a profit if a third party succeeded with a higher bid. Id. at 868. The majority opinion found
unpersuasive the defendant's claim that they had negotiated a bona ide "market test" period during
which the fairness of the offer price could be tested through the development of an auction. Id. at
878-80.
59. This consequence of the case is noted in passing in Schwartz & Wiles, supra note 6, at 448.
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seek out a white knight, adopt a poison pill, buy or sell off assets, leverage
up its capital structure, or adopt whatever other defensive measure may be
effective under the circumstances. Then, when the investment bank re-
turns with the expected opinion that the offer is "grossly inadequate", the
target will be well-prepared to reject the offer and fend off the expected
assault.
If, on the other hand, the board wishes to accept the offer, it can ar-
range for a speedy opinion by the investment bank stating that the offer
price is fair to shareholders and that immediate acceptance of the offer is
imperative. The board can then meet and, after carefully documented dis-
cussion about the pros and cons of the offer, can approve the proposal
with virtually iron-clad assurance that they will face no personal liability
for their actions. In short, Trans Union greatly enhances the flexibility of
an incumbent board in dealing with the difficulties inherent in takeover
bids.
Thus, under our reading of Trans Union, statutes permitting corpora-
tions to absolve directors from personal liability for breaches of their fidu-
ciary duty of care 0 do not "overrule Trans Union" as is sometimes sup-
posed. 1 Rather, such statutes achieve a purpose that is virtually identical
to the result reached in Trans Union by providing a mechanism by which
the boards of directors of covered corporations can relieve themselves of
personal liability for certain corporate decisions.6 2
The Trans Union decision benefits incumbent boards in one other re-
spect. At the heart of the decision is the court's judgment that the board
had acted without sufficient information on which to base a determination
of the intrinsic value of Trans Union as a going concern." The court
rejected the argument that the merger price of $55 per share was ade-
quate because it represented a substantial premium over market price,
opining instead that "the market had consistently undervalued the worth
of Trans Union's stock."6 4
The court's rejection of the efficient capital markets hypothesis65 pro-
60. E.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986). Twenty-five states have adopted
statutes that authorize the adoption of charter amendments that reduce or eliminate a director's liabil-
ity for violations of the fiduciary duty of care. See 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. 1094 (3rd
ed. Supp. 1988).
61. See, e.g., Note, Delaware's Limit on Director Liability: How the Market for Incorporation
Shapes Corporate Law, 10 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 665 (1987).
62. These statutes do alter the result reached in Trans Union in one significant respect. Directors
who are absolved by statute from personal liability for breaches of their fiduciary duty of care no
longer will have an incentive to advise the creation of a heavy "papering" of corporate decisionmaking
as a means of avoiding such liability. But a paper record will still be desirable as a means of insulat-
ing the directors and the corporation from suits for injunctive relief. Corporate attorneys will also
press for heavy "papering" of transactions in order to insulate themselves from potential legal mal-
practice claims. And, of course, the directors of those corporations that have not chosen to absolve their
directors of liability will still have an incentive to develop such a paper record.
63. Trans Union, 488 A.2d at 876.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 876. The efficient markets hypothesis posits that the market price of a widely traded
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vides an additional protection for incumbent boards fighting hostile offers.
Because such offers are always made at a large premium over the pre-
existing market price, it is difficult to justify defensive maneuvers if the
efficient capital markets hypothesis is accepted.68 In rejecting the hypothe-
sis and holding that a company can have an "intrinsic" value different
from its present marketplace value, the Trans Union court provided doc-
trinal support for all sorts of potential defensive maneuvers by target
boards.67
When understood as a takeover case, the perplexing features of Trans
Union noted in Part I become quite unproblematic. The apparent discrep-
ancy between the articulated legal standard of gross negligence and the
facts can readily be explained as reflecting the Delaware Supreme Court's
wish to fashion a speedy remedy to the perceived problem of "coercive"
rush offers. The court in effect made an example of the Trans Union
board in order to protect incumbent boards in the future. Holding the
board members liable was sure to send the strongest possible message to
the corporate bar that rush offers need not be entertained. Yet future
boards of directors should not fear liability. The gross negligence standard
is rhetorically high enough to insulate the actions of virtually any board so
long as extreme dereliction of duty is not shown. 8 Further, as noted ear-
lier, future boards can easily protect themselves from liability by making a
show of due deliberation and by obtaining a suitable fairness opinion from
an investment banking firm. Similarly, and perhaps more importantly, the
opinion in Trans Union will make it easier for boards to prevent hostile
bidders from obtaining injunctive relief against target boards who engage
in defensive tactics that forestall auctions for firms already "in play," be-
cause target management can invoke Trans Union to argue that such de-
security will reflect all public information about the value of the stock. See generally Gilson & Kraak-
man, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
66. But not impossible. See Bebchuk, supra note 56 (endorsing solicitation of competing bids).
67. We are grateful to Professor Ron Gilson for this observation. Of course, Trans Union is not
unique in its rejection of the efficient capital markets hypothesis. Other Delaware opinions, particu-
larly Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983) also have rejected the hypothesis.
However, the reaffirmation of the rejection of the efficient capital markets hypothesis in Trans Union
is noteworthy because other courts with influence and expertise in corporate law matters have firmly
embraced the hypothesis. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 990-92 (1988) ("Recent empiri-
cal studies have tended to confirm Congress' premise that the market price of shares traded on well-
developed markets reflects all publicly available information .... "); Dynamics Co. v. CTS Co., 794
F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1986) ("the market price of publicly traded stock impounds all available
information about the value of the stock"), rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
68. An examination of subsequent Delaware cases reveals that there has been no pattern of in-
creased director liability in the wake of Trans Union. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Rosenblatt v.
Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985); Prime Computer, Inc. v. Allen, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 10
(Jan. 25, 1988); Solash v. Telex Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,608 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988);
Grobow v. Perot, 526 A.2d 914 (Del. Ch. 1987). For an analysis of post-Trans Union cases, see




fensive measures are necessary to allow managers sufficient time to con-
sider fully the merits of the competing offers.
While imposing personal liability on a corporate board is difficult to
square with traditional Business Judgment jurisprudence in Delaware,
providing incumbent board members with means to fend off potentially
coercive takeover bids is entirely within the mainstream of recent deci-
sions, and imposing personal liability on the Trans Union board did this
most effectively.69 Within the past few years the Delaware Supreme
Court has issued a number of important opinions in takeover cases favor-
ing enhanced powers for incumbent board members to fend off unwanted
takeover bids.70 As Mr. Justice Moore once said, "there will never be
another Van Gorkom.
1
The mysterious anti-management bias of the Trans Union case also
disappears when the decision is viewed in the takeover context. A decision
that enhances the level of business judgment scrutiny generally can easily
be seen as anti-management. But under our analysis, Trans Union is a
pro-management decision. It increases the power of incumbent managers
to safeguard their positions and to remain in control of their corporations,
at virtually no cost to any board members other than those few who were
caught up in the unfortunate web of the Trans Union case itself. The
tone of the opinion can also be understood in light of our theory. If the
court wanted to send a message to the corporate bar, the uncharacteristi-
cally hostile and anti-management tone of the opinion was well-calculated
to convey the message as forcefully as possible.
Finally, when viewed as a takeover case, the remedy prescribed by
Trans Union is far more than a nostrum. To be sure, the case will in-
crease the use of investment bankers and lawyers in corporate decision-
making. We agree with the proposition that in general the increased "pa-
pering" of board decisions will not substantially raise the level of
deliberations. In this respect, the case appears as a boon to investment
bankers and lawyers, but as a net cost for shareholders of Delaware cor-
porations and for the nation's economy generally. Yet this perspective is
incomplete, for it overlooks the most important feature. In the takeover
69. Chittur, supra note 5, at 542, suggests that Trans Union imposes stringent limits on an
incumbent board's ability to fend off hostile bids, a dubious view in light of the evidence that the case
will strengthen the board's power to resist takeovers.
70. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). The most prominent ostensi-
ble exception, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986),
should be understood as applying only when the sale of a company is inevitable.
Our interpretation of Trans Union is also consistent with recent actions by the Delaware legisla-
ture. Section 102(b)(7) of the Corporation Code, enacted in 1986, allows Delaware corporations to
limit or eliminate directors' exposure to money damages for duty of care violations. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1987). More recently, the legislature adopted powerful new anti-takeover
protections for incumbent managers. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988).
71. See supra note 1.
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context to which it applies, Trans Union prescribes a potent antidote to
rush takeover offers. It is anything but a purely procedural decision when
understood in this context.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS
If our analysis of Trans Union is correct, we must inquire whether the
case so interpreted is sound as a matter of social policy. In our view, the
answer to that question depends on empirical variables, presently un-
known, relating to the costs and benefits of the decision. It is thus impossi-
ble to assess the opinion in the abstract. It is possible, however, to identify
the relevant variables and to describe their likely magnitude.
The costs of the case are significant. First, the introduction of attorneys'
and investment bankers' workproduct as a routine element of many corpo-
rate decisions will add substantially to the costs of major transactions in-
volving Delaware firms. These costs, however, may have been overstated
in the first flush of dismay following the issuance of the opinion.72 If, as
we suggest, Trans Union is best understood as a takeover case, the need
for "papering" transactions outside the takeover context will be minimal.
It is extremely unlikely that Trans Union will ever be applied outside the
takeover context, because doing so would not serve its purposes, which are
unique to that context.7 - And even in takeover cases, it is very unlikely,
for reasons already stated, that future boards will be held liable for re-
jecting takeover bids even if the level of deliberation might be questioned
under a literal reading of Trans Union. As the bar and corporate boards
begin to understand these facts, the amounts spent on protective legal and
investment banker opinions may become more manageable.
Second, Trans Union imposes a more subtle, but ultimately more prob-
lematic, cost on shareholders of Delaware-chartered firms. The protection
against unwanted takeover bids that the case affords is likely in some cases
to deter or defeat desirable bids.74 As the Delaware Supreme Court has
72. See, e.g., Fishel, supra note 4, at 1454-55.
73. Our analysis thus allays the fears of those, such as Professor Fischel, who believe that Trans
Union will lead to more timid behavior by corporate managers in general. See Fischel, supra note 4,
at 1453-54.
74. The empirical evidence is overwhelming that hostile takeovers benefit shareholders of target
firms by giving them a substantial premium over the pre-existing market price. See, e.g., Bradley,
Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345, 345-46, 375 (1980)
(demonstrating that shareholders of target company gain from takeovers whether or not they tender
their shares); Bradley, Desai & Kim, Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and Their Divi-
sion Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 31 J. FIN. EcON. - (1988) (forth-
coming) (finding premiums of about 29% in single bidder offers and 42% in multiple bidder offers);
Dodd & Ruback, Tender Offers and Stockholder Returns: An Empirical Analysis, 5 J. FIN. EcoN.
351, 372 (1977) (concluding that shareholders of target corporations earn "large and significant ab-
normal returns" in month following announcement of tender offer); Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic
Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & EcON. 371, 381-82
(1980) (refuting "corporate piracy" theory of takeover effects); Jensen & Ruback, The Market for
Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983) (summarizing results of thir-
teen prior studies); Kummer & Hoffmeister, Valuation Consequences of Cash Tender Offers, 33 J.
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itself noted, a "specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own
interests"75 pervades actions taken by incumbent boards to fend off un-
wanted bidders. Boards may want to fend off offers that actually would be
in the shareholders' best interests in order to protect the powers and per-
quisites of office.
7 6
On the other hand, the Trans Union case might be expected to afford
some benefits to Delaware firms. First, the case may enhance the quality
of the deliberative process within the corporate boardroom, thereby bring-
ing benefits to corporate shareholders in the form of sounder decisionmak-
ing. However, we believe, along with the majority of commentators, that
the benefits of such increased deliberation are likely to be small, because
of the ease with which corporate boards, aided by a phalanx of sophisti-
cated lawyers and investment bankers, can cloak result-oriented decision-
making in the guise of careful deliberation.
More importantly, Trans Union will tend to stimulate competitive auc-
tions for target firms. 7 A rush offer by definition is designed to deter an
auction by forcing the board to commit early to favoring one bidder.
Trans Union, by deterring rush offers, may tend to force certain takeover
contests into an auction format in which two or more bidders will compete
for the firm.78 The result will be to benefit shareholders in many cases by
increasing the amounts they are paid for their stock. 9 Auctions may also
have the socially beneficial consequence of directing a firm's assets to the
bidder that shows, by its willingness to outbid rivals, that it believes itself
to be best able to make productive use of those assets.80
But an unrestricted and uncontrolled auction, which, in the market for
corporate control, often manifests itself in the form of a protracted bidding
FIN. 505, 516 (1978) (finding that takeovers maximize use of corporate resources and return to share-
holders); OFFICE OF CHIEF ECONOMIST, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE ECONOM-
ICS OF ANY-OR-ALL, PARTIAL, AND Two-TIER TENDER OFFERS (1985) (surveying literature and
concluding that takeovers offer substantial economic benefits to shareholders of target firms).
75. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
76. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeat-
ing Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277 (1984); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations:
The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981).
77. See the insightful discussion of the benefits of tender offers in Bebchuk, supra note 56.
78. To the extent that Trans Union is interpreted as requiring an auction for a firm even where
the company is not already "in play," it must be regarded as even more intrusive on managerial
autonomy than Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
(holding that asset lock-up that terminated pre-existing auction for target firm's shares was not in
shareholders' interests and should be enjoined). Trans Union, however, should not be interpreted as
reaching this result. See supra note 1 and text accompanying notes 59-60 (arguing that Trans Union
gives managers time to encourage auction if they think it best, but does not curb managerial decisions
to resist hostile takeovers altogether so long as such decisions are fully documented).
79. A recent important study by Bradley, Desai & Kim, supra note 74, documents the striking
increases in target firm shareholder welfare that result from multi-party auctions as compared with
single-bid offers.
80. See generally Englebrecht-Wiggans, Auctions and Bidding Model: A Survey, 26 MGmT. SC.
119 (1980); Banzel, Measurement Cost in the Oranization of Markets, 2 J.L. & ECON. 27 (1982);
Milgram & Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50 ECONOMETRICS 1089 (1982).
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war among rival suitors, is not unambiguously good for shareholders. In
any auction where bidders must invest resources to determine the appro-
priate bid price for assets to be sold, each bidder's expected profit falls as
the number of bidders increases."1 This phenomenon is due to the diminu-
tion in probability that any particular bidder will win the auction as well
as to the decline in the likely payoff to the winning bidder that occurs
when more bidders enter the contest. As a consequence, where an initial
bidder knows that an auction may develop for a firm it is attempting to
acquire, that bidder will be less likely to bid, since its expected return
declines. Thus, to the extent that Trans Union facilitates the creation of
an auction market, it may harm shareholders by reducing the probability
that they ever will experience a tender offer bid for their shares.8 2
Similarly, economic theory makes it clear that, while asset owners (i.e.,
target shareholders) who wish to sell their assets can select among a vari-
ety of sales techniques, including several different types of auctions, it is
they who inevitably bear the pre-bid costs of potential buyers."3 In order
to minimize the cost of selling their assets, asset owners will employ dif-
ferent sales techniques in different circumstances."
Foremost among the concerns of asset owners who wish to dispose of an
asset at the lowest possible cost is the desire to reduce the investment of
potential purchasers in acquiring information already in the asset owners'
possession. Bidders who are forced to invest resources to acquire such in-
formation will reduce the amount they are willing to pay for the asset by
the amount spent to acquire it, and asset owners easily can eliminate this
cost by providing the information themselves, unless the credibility of the
asset owner is at issue. In addition, this information is completely non-
productive; it does not in any way affect the underlying value of the asset.
For these reasons, if the value of an asset is likely to be the same to any
purchaser (i.e., if the asset is traded on a "thick market") it makes little
81. See French & McCormick, Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Competition, 57 J.
Bus. 417, 423 (1984).
82. Some commentators, most notably Ronald Gilson, contend that the level of monitoring actu-
ally increases where firms conduct an auction since bidders can recoup an informational investment by
buying the stock of a target firm and selling to a higher bidder during an auction. In such cases, an
auction permits specialization among information gatherers who make initial bids, and managerial
teams, who are the ultimate purchasers of the firm at the auction. See Gilson, Seeking Competitive
Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REv. 51 (1982).
This argument has a surface plausibility, but if Gilson is correct, it is the initial bidder rather than
the target firm's management that should make the decision about whether the target firm should be
sold at auction. This is because the first bidder has made the initial investment in information about
the target, and does not face the same conflict of interest as incumbent management when it makes the
decision about whether to promote an auction for the target firm. Cf Easterbrook & Fisehel, Auctions
and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1982) (arguing that even if first bidders could
recover their sunk costs in information and earn return on their investment in acquisition of such
information, auction would reduce the return on their investment below what they would receive in
absence of auction).
83. French & McCormick, supra note 81, at 425.
84. See Haddock, Macey & McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender
Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701 (1987).
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sense to have bidders invest resources in discovering new information
about the target.
One way to handle the situation of multiple bidders engaging in a
costly search for the value of an asset is to limit the number of firms
allowed to bid. 5 On the other hand, if a particular asset will have a dif-
ferent value to different customers (like a Ming vase or a painting by
Claude Monet), increasing the number of bidders may be in the asset
owners' interests.
86
In the absence of agency costs, firms will balance the benefit of holding
an auction for their shares (which comes in the form of a higher potential
sales price) against the cost (which comes in the form of lower probability
that an initial bid will be made due to the diminution in returns to bid-
ders). But in the face of agency costs that pervade the large, publicly held
corporation, the rule announced in Trans Union, which gives incumbent
management broad discretion to reduce the probability that a hostile
tender offer will ever be made, may dilute shareholders' prospects of in-
creasing the odds of obtaining an outside bid for their shares.
Ultimately, we are left with competing costs and benefits. Our intuition
is that Trans Union may be harmful to shareholders: the benefits of in-
creasing the likelihood of auctions will tend to be outweighed by the costs
in terms of beneficial takeover bids that are abandoned or never initiated,
and increased investment banker and lawyer fees. Any adequate evalua-
tion of the decision, however, must take into account the all-important
implications of the fact that Trans Union is a takeover decision and not
an ordinary business judgment case.
85. See Johnson, Auction Markets, Bid Preparation Costs and Entrance Fees, 55 LAND ECON.
313 (1979). Johnson suggests that the use of entry fees to restrict bidders will allow the seller to
capture more of the gains from entry restrictions. Such entry fees may, however, be difficult to ar-
range in a tender offer context since potential bidders are not specified ex ante.
86. See French & McCormick, supra note 81, at 428-30.
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